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Federal Loyalty-Security
Removals, 1946-1956
Robert J. Morgan*
Few persons witnessing events of the past decade would have
much difficulty in agreeing with Justice Douglas that the "problems
of security are real. So are the problems of freedom. The para-
mount issue of the age is to reconcile the two."' Nor is it any less
obvious that during this time government employees have been
attractive and largely helpless targets of statutory and administra-
tive regulations intended to scour the public service of actual or
potential subversive taint. The loyalty and security programs have
posed problems of accommodating our traditions of constitutional
liberty to executive power exerted in the name of national security.
This situation has called for a measure of judicial scrutiny of
executive personnel management largely unknown in more quiet
times. With the morale and effectiveness of much of the federal
bureaucracy at stake, few issues adjudicated by the courts have re-
sulted in a more cautious balance between judicial restraint and
activism.
Quite naturally cases testing the validity of the two programs
have been pushed into the courts to metamorphize a bitterly partisan
issue into the jargon of legal disputation. However, finding the bal-
ance of public and private interest has not been easy. There is cer-
tainly some evidence of a disposition by even the most temperate of
our citizens to be more than ordinarily suspicious of the political
radical. But far more important in the development of legal doc-
trine has been the necessity for courts to develop de hovo, and with
becoming caution, principles which are both logical and acceptable
in the long run in dealing with the question of removing public
employees in the interests of national security. Especially have the
* B.S. 1940, Iowa State College, Ph.D. 1951; University of Virginia;
presently Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Nebraska.
1Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 174
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courts been influenced by the long standing view that public em-
ployment is not a right and that it is not the business of the courts
to intervene in questions of fitness of executive employees to per-
form their assigned tasks.
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CIVIL SERVICE REMOVALS
It is doubtful whether any idea has contributed more to the
precarious position of civil servants in the security crisis than the
germ of truth in Holmes' hyperbole, "petitioner may have a con-
stitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right
to be a policeman."2 With little or no variation this theme has
served the apologists for the Truman and Eisenhower programs.
Unfortunately, however, much more is involved in the security
program than the right to talk politics. Neither a wholesale con-
demonation of security procedures nor an uncompromising support
of summary dismissals deserves thoughtful support.
It is well settled that no officer or employee of the federal
government has a vested property right in his office nor in his
compensation except for services actually rendered.3 He does not
enjoy a vested right of employment which Congress may not take
from him.4 In fact, courts have viewed federal employment to be
a "privilege revocable by the sovereignty at will .... 5" Moreover,
Congressional regulation of federal employment conditions to pro-
mote efficiency, integrity and discipline has long been judicially
2 McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
3 Taylor and Marshall v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1899).
4 Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99 (1889), citing Butler v. Pennsyl-
vania, 51 U.S. (6 How.) 402 (1850) and Blake v. United States, 103 U.S. 227
(1880).
5 Id. at 108. This "privilege doctrine", generally accepted by state and
federal courts alike, has served as the rationale for imposing upon public
employees conditions of employment which appear to many observers to
deny civil servants freedom of speech and action in political matters. It
has recently again been criticized as being both illogical and unjust. See
Nelson, Public Employees and the Right to Engage in Political Activities,
9 Vand. L. Rev. 27 (1955). The wisdom of this doctrine is also denied by
Dotson, The Emerging Doctrine of Privilege in Public Employment, 15 Pub.
Admin. Rev. 82 (1955). An explanation of the difference in British and
American treatment of political activities of civil servants may be found
in Epstein, Political Sterilization of Civil Servants: The United States and
Great Britain, 10 Pub. Admin. Rev. 281 (1950).
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recognized as being within the scope of legislative power.6 Thus,
Congress has positively required dismissal of civil servants under
some conditions;7 it has also specified procedures to prevent arbi-
trary removals of classified civil servants.8 It has acted under
pressure of emergency to modify the minimum protection to the
federal employee.9 Congress has also required investigation of the
"loyalty and security"'10 of certain federal employees and officers.
In view of the privilege theory of public employment (which
appears implicitly to place the government worker in a position
vis-a-vis the government analogous to the worker in private em-
ployment) the only protection against removal without explanation
is found in the procedural provisions of the Lloyd-LaFoflette Act
and the Veterans' Preference Act. The former forbids dismissals
from the classified service" except to promote efficiency of the
service. It specifies the employee shall be removed only for reasons
given in writing after being furnished with a copy of the charges
and after having a reasonable time to make a written answer with
supporting affidavits. Specifically, however, the act stipulates that
6 Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882). Four years later the court said. "We
have no doubt that when Congress, by law, vests the appointment of in-
ferior officers in the Heads of Departments it may limit and restrict the
power of removal as it deems best for the public interest .... The head of
a Department has no constitutional prerogative of appointment to offices in-
dependently of the legislation of Congress, and by such legislation he must
be governed, not only in making appointments but in all that is incident
thereto." United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886). In fact, the
authority of Congress to limit removal extends to all but "purely" execu-
tive officers appointed by the President. Humphrey's Executor v. United
States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). The Holmesian hyperbole appears to have
reached a legislative zenith in the old section 9A of the Hatch Act, sus-
tained in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
7 For example see 69 Stat. 6 (1955), 5 U.S.C. § 118j-1 (Supp. 1956) as
amended by 69 Stat. 624 (1955), 5 U.S.C. § 118p (Supp. 1956).
837 Stat. 555 (1912), 5 U.S.C. § 652 (1952); 58 Stat. 390 (1944), 5 U.S.C. §
863 (1946) as amended by 61 Stat. 723 (1947), 5 U.S.C. § 863 (1952).
954 Stat. 713 (1940), 5 U.S.C. § 653 (1952); 64 Stat. 477 (1949), 5 U.S.C.
§§ 22,23 (1952).
1062 Stat. 1152 (1948), 22 U.S.C. § 272(b) (1952); 62 Stat. 441 (1948), 22
U.S.C. § 290(a) (1952); 61 Stat. 103 (1947), 22 U.S.C. § 1434 (1952); 65 Stat.
381 (1951); 22 U.S.C. § 1661 (1952); 60 Stat. 766 (1946), 42 U.S.C. § 1810(b)
(5), (B) (i) (ii) (1952).
11 The term classified service has been defined by statute as consisting of
persons who have been given "competitive status in the classified service,
with or without competitive examination, by legislative enactment, or under
the civil service rules promulgated by the President.. ." 42 Stat. 470 (1922),
5 U.S.C. 658 (1952); Cf. 69 Stat. 709, 5 U.S.C. § 631 (Supp. 1955), for the
definition of the term competitive service now used.
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"no witness nor any trial or hearing shall be required except in
the discretion of the officer making the removal."'12 This act may
not be circumvented by exempting a position from the classified
service to facilitate summary dismissal of a classified civil servant,
but it does not apply to probationary employees. 13 The Veterans'
Preference Act differs in two details from the Lloyd-LaFollette
Act. The former requires that a preference eligible with permanent
or indefinite status have thirty days in which to reply to charges
(in most instances) and that the charges proposing removal must
state "any and all reasons, specifically and in detail, for any such
proposed action.' 14
The federal employee who considers his removal from the serv-
ice unjust has had little to hope for from judicial intervention,
even since passage of Lloyd-LaFollette. Nor is the reason for this
condition difficult to find. More than fifty years ago the Supreme
Court said if it were inappropriate for courts to supervise civil
service examinations, it would be equally improper for them to
determine the fitness of employees in the actual performance of
their duties. Such matters are administrative in nature. 15 A typical
statement of extreme judicial restraint, often cited approvingly
in recent years, is: ".... [T]he courts have uniformly held that the
administrative determination by the employing agency of what
12 37 Stat. 555 (1912), 5 U.S.C. § 652(a) (1952). This section further pro-
vides that "Copies of the charges, the notice of hearing, the answer, the
reasons for removal or suspension without pay shall be made a part of
the records of the proper department or agency . . .and copies of the
same shall be furnished, upon request, to the person affected . . ." Present
civil service rules, however, specify that the charges must be set forth
"specifically and in detail" although the statute imposes no such require-
ment. 5 C.F.R. § 9.102 (Supp. 1952).
'3 On the first point see Roth v. Brownell, 215 F.2d 500 (D.C. Cir. 1954),
cert. denied 348 U.S. 863 (1954); in regard to probationary employees see
Nadelhaft v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 930 (1955): "[Tihe only thing
necessary to do to remove a probationary employee is to tell him why
you are removing him." Id. at 933; for commentaries on the Roth case see
5 Catholic U.L. Rev. 108 (1955) and 43 Geo. L. J. 104 (1955); Cf. Lamb v.
United States, 90 F. Supp. 369 (1950). Even a preference eligible under
the Veterans' Preference Act does not have "permanent or indefinite" status
at the end of his probationary period, if he is subject to further investigations
under the rules of the Civil Service Commission. Kirkpatrick v. Gray and
Priestly v. Donaldson, 198 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied 346 U.S.
937 (1954). Cf. 61 Stat. 723 (1947), 5 U.S.C. § 863 (1952).
14 58 Stat. 390 (1949), 5 U.S.C. § 863 (1952); the preference eligible also
has a right to appeal to the civil service commission from an adverse decision
by an administrative officer; Cf. 5 C.F. § 22.10-.11 (Cum. Supp. 1955).
15 United States ex. rel. Taylor v. Taft, 203 U.S. 461 (1906); Keim v. United
States, 177 U.S. 290 (1900).
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constitutes causes for discharge will not be judicially reviewed."'16
The action of an appointing officer in removing an employee upon
written charges and after giving an opportunity to reply "is beyond
review in the courts . . . the courts are powerless to review the
merits of a valid charge."'71 Even when administrative officers
admit the erroneous removal of an employee, as long as the "things
required by law and regulations were done, and the discretion of
the authorized officers was exercised as required by law . . . the
action of executive officers is not subject to revision in the courts."' 8
A more temperate and accurate statement of the rule, at the present,
at least, seems to be that where "there has been a substantial de-
parture from applicable procedures, a misconstruction of governing
legislation, or like error going to the heart of administrative de-
16 Carter v. Forrestal, 175 F.2d 364,365 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 832 (1949).
17 Levine v. Farley, 107 F.2d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
622 (1940).
18 Eberlein v. United States, 257 U.S. 82, 84 (1921). Granting also the er-
roneous removal of a classified civil servant, the doctrine of laches may
bar him from judicial review. "When a public official is unlawfully re-
moved from office, whether from disregard of the law by his superior or
from mistake as to the facts of his case, obvious considerations of public
policy make it of first importance that he should promptly take the action
requisite to effectively assert his rights, to the end that if his contentions
be justified the Government service may be disturbed as little as possible
and that two salaries shall not be paid for a single service." United States
ex. rel. Arant v. Lane, 249 U.S. 307, 372 (1919). This rule was applied in
Nicholas v. United States, 257 U.S. 71 (1921) and Norris v. United States,
257 U.S. 77 (1921). In a case where a attorney in the Department of
Justice was removed before the end of his probationary period without an
unsatisfactory rating, the court found the removal erroneous, but added
the view that "we have said many times in similar cases, the courts should
be slow in issuing mandamus which may result in interfering with the
internal management of executive departments." Borak v. Biddle, 141 F.2d
278 (D.C. Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 738 (1944); Hammond v. Hull,
131 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1942). Farley v. United States, 92 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir.
1937). The Court of Claims has even been quoted approvingly in saying
that "allegations that the plaintiff was innocent of the charges preferred
against him . . . and that the investigation which resulted in his removal
was biased, prejudiced, and unfair, are immaterial." Levy v. Woods, 171
F.2d 145, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1948). See, however, Knotts v. United States, 121
F.Supp. 630 (1954). Speaking in an early case the Court said: "In all these
departments, the power is given to the Secretary to appoint all necessary
clerks.... And although no power to remove is expressly given, yet there
can be no doubt, that these clerks hold their offices at the will and discretion
of the head of the department . . . the absence of all constitutional pro-
vision, or statutory regulation, it would seem to be a sound and necessary
rule to consider the power of removal as incident to the power of appoint-
ment." Ex. parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Peters) 230, 259-60 (1839).
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termination, a measure of judicial relief may on occasion be ob-
tained."' 9
In fact, in several cases in the past four years there has been
a noticeable tendency for the federal courts to read some restrictions
into the governing statutes in behalf of classified civil servants.
These decisions are of real importance in the loyalty and security
cases. In the first place, the doctrine that a discharge motivated
by malice and for reasons other than the good of the service is un-
lawful was applied in Knotts v. United States where the aggrieved
classified employee was able to demonstrate to the court a plot to
drive her out of her position in the National Labor Relations
Board.20 It is obvious the court did not relish determining such a
case on its merits and it added a word of caution for the future,
saying that "personnel disputes are hard to resolve. In undertaking
to do so, we start with the presumption that the official acted in
good faith."21 Whether this doctrine could successfully be applied
to loyalty and security cases is difficult to say, since judgment on
the merits would almost inevitably lead to a demand that sources
of information be revealed to test the worth of allegations against
an employee.
Of more significance, however, is the doctrine that charges
against the employee must be specific. Cases involving both the
Lloyd-LaFollette Act and the Veterans' Preference Act have been
similarly treated, although there is some difference in the wording
of the two acts.22 A supervisory employee in the Philadelphia
19Powell v. Brannan, 196 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1952). An officer or em-
ployee wrongfully removed by one having no authority so to act is entitled
to compensation provided by law during his suspension. United States v.
Wickersham, 201 U.S. 390 (1905). For commentary on the problem of
judicial review of civil service discharges see Richardson, Problems in the
Removal of Federal Civil Servants, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 219 (1955); Gardner,
The Great Charter and the Case of Angilly v. United States, 67 Harv. L. Rev.
1 (1953); Westwood, The Right of An Employee of the United States Against
Arbitrary Discharge, 7 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 212 (1938). See also Notes, 49
Nw. U.L. Rev. 816 (1955) 23 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 69 (1954), 60 Harv. L. Rev.
779 (1947), 47 Colum. L. Rev. 1161 (1947).
20 130 Ct. Cl. 574, 121 F. Supp. 630 (1954); the doctrine was first announced
in Gadsen v. United States, 120 Ct. Cl. 820. 78 F. Supp. 126 (1848), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 856 (1952) (dismissal of the employee was in this case
upheld as valid since a finding of malice was lacking).
21 130 Ct. Cl. 574, 121 F. Supp. 630,631 (1954) (Knotts received back pay),
but her reinstatement was not involved).
22That is, the Lloyd-LaFollette Act provides only that the employee be
given the "reasons" for his removal or suspension, whereas the Veterans'
Preference Act provides that he shall be given "any and all reasons,
specifically and in detail" for removal or suspension. 62 Stat 354 (1948),
5 U.S.C. 652 (a) (1952); 61 Stat 723 (1947), 5 U.S.C. 863 (1952).
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Navy Yard was removed from the classified service on charges that
he had kissed two women at a shop party, had made "improper
advances" toward two others who resented his action, and had had
abnormal sexual relations over a period of years with teen-age girls
in National Park, N.J. He was given three days to reply to the
charges and he did so to the best of his ability at that time. After
his discharge he brought suit in a New Jersey court against the
persons who had accused him of immoral conduct and he was
awarded $5,000 in punitive damages. He then sought invalidation
of his removal and prayed for reinstatement because the charges
against him were not sufficiently specific. The court of appeals
held that under the Lloyd-LaFollette Act charges preferred for
removal "must be specific enough to provide for a fair opportunity
for refutation by the innocent who have no knowledge of the con-
duct charged, as well as the guilty who do possess such knowledge.
To meet that requirement in the present case . . . the first charge
must include the names of the women involved .. ",23 A similar
result followed in the case of a veteran's preference eligible em-
ployee in the Department of the Army 24 and in the case of an
employee in the Internal Revenue Service.25 In the latter case the
court observed, however, that the purpose of the statutory require-
ment giving the employee reasons for his removal "is not to provide
a record to facilitate judicial review of such 'reasons' on their merits,
since review is narrowly limited by the absence of statutory pro-
vision therefor. On the contrary, it is required as a procedural
safeguard against just the sort of errors which, if committed at the
administrative level, are beyond the reach of our review.' ' -2 6
In Money v. Anderson and the more recent Williams v. Cra-
vens2 7 two important distinctions regarding the exactness of charges
have been made. In the former case the court said no "reason ap-
pears and none is offered for withholding more specific charges
here. Considerations of national security, said to require protection
for confidential informants under Executive Order 9835 . . . in
Bailey v. Richardson are not present. 2 8 In Williams the court re-
23Money v. Anderson, 208 F.2d 34,37-8 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (the court here
did not consider whether suit was barred by laches, although the issue was
raised and ignored in the district court).
24 Manning v. Stevens, 208 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (construing the Vet-
erans' Preference Act).
25 Mulligan v. Andrews, 211 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (construing the Lloyd-
LaFollette Act).
26 Id. at 31.
27 210 F.2d 874 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
28 Money v. Anderson, 208 F.2d 34,38 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
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fused to find the removal of a loan examiner in the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation invalid for the lack of specific charges when
he had been dismissed for unreliable judgment and poor recom-
mendations on loan applications. The situation in such a case must
be distinguished, the court said, from that in cases "where the
'charge' involved was one of dereliction, possibly criminal in char-
acter."29
On one other point, however, courts in construing the statutes
have given the civil servant little comfort. The Lloyd-LaFollette
Act, of course, specifically disavows any requirement of a hearing
and makes the granting of one an act of grace by the removing
officer. Nor does the Veterans' Preference Act grant any more.
It has been held that this statute "... indicates no intention to require
a hearing of the adversary type, with compulsory confrontation
by witnesses .... The selection and retention of employees in the
executive branch of the Government is peculiarly within the powers
of the executive, under congressional direction or limitation."3
In short, guide lines of judicial intervention in civil service re-
movals have been such as to limit review largely, but not exclu-
sively, to insure compliance with statutory and administrative pro-
cedural requirements. With employees enjoying no statutory right
to a hearing, much less to an adversary proceeding, the courts have
nevertheless recently shown a disposition to require charges for
removal to be specific enough to allow an adequate defense by the
employee enjoying the benefits of the Lloyd-LaFollette and Vet-
erans' Preference Acts.
II. THE LOYALTY-SECURITY CASES
The evolution of case law on loyalty and security dismissals re-
flects certain remarkably consistent patterns strongly influenced
by the case law of ordinary civil service dismissals. On the whole,
too, constitutional issues which many commentators consider to
29 Williams v. Cravens, 210 F.2d 874,876 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The court here
specifically distinguished this case from Money v. Anderson and Manning
v Stevens, supra, as well as from Deak v. Pace, 185 F.2d 997 (1950). Never-
theless, if several charges are preferred as the basis for removal, they need
not all be specific unless all are necessary to effect the removal. Thus, only
if removal is based on cumulative charges, is it necessary that they all be
specific. Deviny v. Campbell, 194 F.2d 876 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
S Deviny v. Campbell, supra at 880. But 5 C.F.R. § 22.9 (Supp. 1955) now
provides that a preference eligible shall have a right to a hearing at his
request. At such hearing he may produce and cross-examine witnesses,
testimony shall be under oath and a summary of the proceedings satis-
factory to the parties shall be made part of the record available to the
employee.
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be involved have, for the most part, been avoided by the courts
either through denial of their existence or by a narrow interpre-
tation of guiding statutes or administrative orders. It also seems
that the loyalty purge had largely run its course before potentially
effective formulae for restraining some abuses could enjoy the
support of a majority in the two courts which have decided virtu-
ally all of the important cases.
A. THE REMOVAL POWER AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS
The first three cases to reach the Supreme Court directly involv-
ing loyalty dismissals seemed clearly to vindicate the government's
program. The loyalty removals during World War II were upheld
in Friedman v. Schwellenbach.31 Friedman was a temporary ap-
pointee subject to character investigation and denial of appoint-
ment if there were reasonable doubt of his loyalty.32 Although
he did not enjoy the benefits of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, he was
given two hearings at which he admitted he had opposed entry
of the United States into the war against Germany until the
latter's hostilities with the Soviet Union broke out. Brushing
aside Friedman's contention that his dismissal on the order of
the Civil Service Commission was a violation of statute, civil
service regulations and constitutional rights protecting political
opinions, the court held the administrative finding to be conclu-
sive and beyond judicial review as long as it was not arbitrary
and was within the scope of official discretion. The court took the
view that the government had the power to prescribe qualifications
and to deny employment to persons who failed to meet them. It
was reasonable for the government to determine that its employees
were loyal and to refuse to appoint those whose loyalty was in doubt.
The court denied that it could be concerned with whether Friedman
was in fact loyal or disloyal; it was enough that the Commission had
a reasonable doubt of his loyalty. The court's language, however,
was sweeping enough to sustain not only denials of appointment,
but also to encompass removals when loyalty was the issue.
Bailey v. Richardson"3 also involved the discharge of a tempo-
rary appointee subject to loyalty clearance under Executive Order
9835, 34 although Miss Bailey once had been in the classified service
before being "riffed" out. She asserted her loyalty despite mem-
31159 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 838 (1947).
32 Executive Order 9067, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (1942) and War Service Regula-
tions of March 16, 1942, 7 Fed. Reg. 7723 (1942).
33 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided court with
Mr. Justice Clark not participating, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
34 3 C.F.R. 129 (Supp. 1947).
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bership in several organizations proscribed by the Attorney General.
She enjoyed the support of several witnesses at the hearings con-
ducted by various loyalty boards. Unlike Friedman, this case chal-
lenged the government's use of the faceless informer and its barring
Miss Bailey from service for three years. The court invalidated
the three-year bar, holding it to be punishment applied to the indi-
vidual and indistinguishable from the permanent proscription dealt
with similarly in the earlier Lovett case. 3 5 The court noted, on the
other hand, that a general regulation effecting the same result might
not be invalid. In dealing with the faceless informer, the court per-
mitted itself the license of discussion ". . . upon the assumption that
a Government employee in the classified service is being dismissed
. . ." upon loyalty grounds.36 (emphasis added.) Here the court
was on well-worn ground. Traditionally, it said, the employee has
had no right to a quasi-judicial trial or hearing before being dis-
missed from the service and even if the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment were to apply, it is doubtful it would require
specific charges, confrontation and cross-examination on evidence
openly submitted. The constitutional test for retention of executive
employees is the confidence of their superiors and confidence is not
controllable by judicial process. The cold war justifies a public in-
terest in shrouding in secrecy the means by which the President de-
tects disloyalty and he should not be put in the dilemma either of
continuing a loyalty suspect in the service or of revealing sources
and methods by which disloyalty is detected. The Constitution does
not forbid "a policy of caution in respect to members of the Com-
munist Party in the Government Service under current circum-
stances."37 (emphasis added.) Risks and estimates of danger are
for the President to make and no court has the power to force him
to retain a suspect employee, even if his removal action injures her.
She has no redress because she has no right to a government job.
Even Judge Edgerton, in voicing a vigorous dissent against a con-
cept of loyalty which permits dismissals for what he called a state
of mind, would voice no opinion on validity of the loyalty order
as applied to sensitive positions.
In short, the court denied Miss Bailey's claim that dismissal
35 Lovett v. United States, 328 U.S. 303,316 (1946); "This permanent pro-
scription from any opportunity to serve the Government is punishment, and
of a most severe type."
36 182 F.2d at 55 (the majority stated that it understood Miss Bailey to be
contesting only the three year bar and that she was merely an applicant
for appointment. Miss Bailey was not in the classified service and she was
no more than an applicant for the appointment-like Friedman).
37 Id. at 65.
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from government service on loyalty grounds is punishment requir-
ing a jury trial; denied that the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment requires specific charges, confrontation and cross-
examination of witnesses and a hearing upon evidence openly
submitted; and denied that the First Amendment bars discrimina-
tion against government employees because of their political
views.38
In Washington v. McGrath the Truman loyalty order was again
attacked-this time on the ground that it had been applied discrim-
inatorily against several Jewish and Negro postal employees be-
cause of their associations with proscribed organizations. Consider-
ing the issue settled by earlier decisions, the court dismissed this
claim on the ground that there was no showing of discrimination
in fact. 9
Inability to get a majority in loyalty cases coming before the
Supreme Court during 1951 (because Mr. Justice Clark absented
himself from these cases) made it difficult to know the high court's
attitude towards the issues. With the shift of one justice, however
(and there are indications it may have been Mr. Justice Burton),
the decision in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath
38 In the light of recent developments one of the important aspects of this
case is Miss Bailey's argument that she had not enjoyed the procedural
safeguards of the President's loyalty order. In attacking the use of faceless
informers against her, she contended that the government had failed to
observe Executive Order 9835, Part II (2) (b) which provided: "The charges
shall be stated as specifically and completely as, in the discretion of the
employing department or agency, security considerations permit." The
court, however, said that the order "leaves specificity a wholly discretionary
matter." Id. at 52. The court held that the Lloyd-LaFollette Act afforded
her no protection because she was not in the classified service, although
she had competitive status. At the time of this decision it appeared that the
court considered the Lloyd-LaFollette Act inapplicable to loyalty cases.
Id. at 52-54. In summary it said: "It is our clear opinion that the President,
absent congressional restriction, may remove from Government service any
person of whose loyalty he is not completely convinced. He may do so
without assigning any reason and without giving the employee any explana-
tory notice. If, as a matter of policy, he chooses to give the employee a gen-
eral description of the information which concerns him and to hear what
the employee has to say, he does not thereby strip himself of any portion
of his constitutional power to choose and remove." Id. at 65 (emphasis
added). Executive Order 10450 makes no mention of the specificity of
charges and presumably reliance has been placed wholly on the provisions
of Public Law 733, 64 Stat. 476 (1950), 5 U.S.C. §22-1 (1952). As a result of
the recent decision in Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1955) it appears that
appropriate statutes will govern the specificity of the charges.
39 182 F.2d 375 (D.C.Cir. 1950) affd by an equally divided court with Mr.
Justice Clark not participating, 341 U.S. 923 (1951).
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made clear the diversity of opinion among the members. Four
(Black, Douglas, Frankfurter and Jackson) preferred to face con-
stitutional issues involving the Attorney General's list of pro-
scribed organizations, but the swing man, Mr. Justice Burton,
yielded to the tug of obligation which was ". . . not to reach these
issues unless the allegations before us squarely present them . ..,,
It was not necessary to go beyond terms of the President's Loyalty
Order to determine that the Attorney General, in branding these
organizations without notice or hearing or the opportunity to rebut
allegations against them, had permitted the ". . . doctrine of ad-
ministrative construction . . . to run riot."'' 4 The fiction that the
President had not authorized his Attorney General to defame the
organizations without a hearing (the court's understanding of the
term "appropriate investigation") was really the aspect of the de-
cision most important to federal employees. For it was this same
attenuated doctrine, that powers conferred by the President's Loy-
alty Order were to be narrowly construed, which enabled the court
to avoid the constitutional issue again in the later Peters v. Hobby4 2
It was evident, as Justice Jackson said, that the real concern
of the court was the federal employee who could not attack the
Attorney General's designation of an organization in loyalty pro-
ceedings. Ordinary removals not violating fixed tenure, he argued,
are not subject to judicial review, but "these are not discretionary
discharges but discharges pursuant to an order having the effect
of law .. .,,43 Justices Black and Douglas specifically condemned
the loyalty procedures and joined Justice Frankfurter in calling
for a broadening of due process, not as ". . . a technical conception
with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances
[but one implying] respect for the elementary rights of men, how-
40 341 U.S. 123,136 (1951).
41 Id. at 138.
42 349 U.S. 331 (1954).
43341 U. S. at 185. In contrast is the view that "civil service regulations
made by the civil service comissioners and the President, and promulgated
by the latter, do not have the effect and force of law, nor can the courts
enforce them as such, or entertain jurisdiction to review the action of an
appointing officer in removing an employee. The President may neverthe-
less enforce them by removing any person who refuses to abide by them.
United States v. Lapp, 244 Fed. 377,382 (6th Cir. 1917). More recently,
however, the view was expressed that the rules of, the Civil Service Com-
mission "undoubtedly have the force and effect of law because of the broad
powers conferred upon the President by Revised Statutes, Section 1753,
5 U.S.C.A. § 631, to make such rules, and by him delegated to the Civil
Service Commission." Nadelhaft v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 930, 932
(1955).
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ever suspect or unworthy. '44 While many an epigram from the
majority side has inspired condemnation of the government's se-
curity program, a court majority in support of a successful consti-
tutional attack upon it is still lacking.
The dissenting justices resorted to the evasive fiction that the
Attorney General's list had no more effect than a press release!
It was intended to assist in determining an employee's loyalty in
proceedings under which he has ". . . never had the right of con-
frontation, cross-examination and quasi-judicial hearing.. .45 Any
administrative hearing granted despite the Lloyd-LaFollette and
Veterans' Preference laws is an act of grace which "does not create
a constitutional right ... or requirement.146
Making a similar fetish of procedural rectitude the court in
Peters v. Hobby again avoided the constitutional issues "in recon-
ciling fundamental constitutional guarantees with the procedures
used to determine the loyalty of government personnel . . . 7 The
Truman Loyalty Order was meticulously combed only to find that
the long established practice of post-auditing cases, including those
favorable to the employee under charges, was not authorized and
could not be presumed to enjoy the President's approval. All con-
stitutional issues involving the stain of loyalty dismissals, "guilt" by
association and use of the faceless informer left unresolved by the
court in Bailey v. Richardson" were consciously side-stepped under
the rule that the court gets to constitutional issues not first, but
last. Dr. Peters had twice been cleared by agency loyalty boards,
first under provisions of Executive Order 9835 and later under the
more unfavorable standard of Executive Order 10241.49 Neverthe-
less, the Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission
ordered a post-audit of his case four years after the original charges
had been twice met successfully. As a result, the board informed
him that he would be discharged on loyalty grounds and that he
was barred from the federal service for three years, despite Bailey
v. Richardson. The Court held that the literal terms of the Presi-
dent's order, however, authorized appeal of findings of a depart-
44 Id. at 162-3,168.
45 Id. at 207.
40 Id at 211-12.
47 349 U.S. 331,338 (1955).
48 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
49 3 C.F.R. 431 (Supp. 1951). It was held in Jason v. Summerfield, 214
F.2d 273 (D.C.Cir. 1954),cert. denied, 348 U.S. 840 (1954), that cases of per-
sons cleared under the standard of Executive Order 9835 (grounds exist to
believe an employee disloyal) could be reopened under the new standard
of reasonable doubt of the loyalty of the person involved.
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mental or agency board to the Loyalty Review Board merely "for
an advisory recommendation."50 Such a procedure, the Chief Jus-
tice said, was in keeping with the principle that a verdict of guilty
is appealable, while one of innocent is not. This feature of the pro-
cedure was one of the few assuring an employee that his fate would
not be decided by political appointees who might buckle under to
public opinion.
Dr. Peters' three-year bar was held invalid on the technical
nicety that since he was not in the classified service, the existing
Rule V, 5.101 (a) did not apply to him.5 '
The dissenting justices thought post-audit practices had been
made so well known to the President by annual reports of the Civil
Service Commission that it scarcely could be said he had not
50 349 U.S. 331, 339 (1954); Executive Order 9835, Part II § 3. The order
further provided that the Loyalty Review Board should have authority "to
review cases involving persons recommended for dismissal on grounds re-
lating to loyalty by the loyalty board of any department or agency and to
make advisory recommendations thereon to the head of the department or
agency. Such cases may be referred to the Board either by the employing
department or agency, or by the officer or employee concerned." Part III
§ L.a. The order also provided: "The Board shall make rules and regula-
tions, not inconsistent with the provisions of this order, deemed necessary
to implement statutes and Executive orders relating to employee loyalty."
Part III § 1. b. 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (1942). The court acknowledged that,
as of the time of decision, twenty agency findings favorable to employees
had been reversed by the LRB. It is of further interest to note the statement
of Mr. Seth Richardson who was chairman of the Loyalty Review Board
when he wrote in 1951 that the Board "generally supervises the operation
of the subordinate boards in two ways: it promulgates detailed regulations
for the administration of loyalty checks by them; its staff of examiners looks
at the files of all the cases handled by subordinate boards to make certain
that those regulations have been complied with. In ordinary cases the Review
Board does not review the judgments of lower boards on the merits al-
though, as a safeguard, it does reserve the power to re-examine and re-try
any loyalty proceeding de novo and without regard to the decision below."
Richardson, The Federal Employee Loyalty Program, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 546,
551 (1951). At another point in this same article Mr. Richardson said: "The
board must be able to consummate its determinations by bringing them to
the attention of the President. Since the final responsibility for employee
suitability lies with him, it is he who determines the disposition of the board
report. In the official life of an employee, however, the department head
acts as the President's representative. Thus, the board report should go to
the head of the department concerned. But it need not go as an order pre-
empting his constitutional authority to discharge employees. Rather, it
should communicate the board's conclusions as information supplied by
another representative of the President, the head of the department finally
determining whether the particular employee shall be dismissed or re-
tained." (Emphasis added) Id. at 517.
51 Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 348 (1955).
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sanctioned them. Moreover, if procedural niceties were in order,
it was proper to note that the decision of the Loyalty Review
Board was only advisory and it was the letter from the Surgeon
General which had separated Peters from service. 52 Justice Reed
considered judicial review of "such intra-executive operations ...
not completely free from doubt. '53 Justices Douglas and Black
agreed with the decision, but were far from satisfied with the
rest of the majority's failure to meet constitutional issues. Justice
Douglas saw the post-audit as a practice sanctioned by the Presi-
dent through usage. The real issue was still that of the faceless
informer through whose information a person could be deprived
of one "of man's most precious liberties . . . his right to work. '54
Sources of information used to destroy a man's reputation "must
be put to the test of due process of law." 55 Justice Black agreed the
case should have been decided on the constitutional issues which
Peters had raised and he added the suggestive observation that here,
as in the Youngstown case, he had grave doubt whether the Presi-
dent's order was authorized by any act of Congress. He not only
considered the President's order to be legislation, but he also
doubted the power of Congress to delegate authority to do what
the President had attempted in the executive order. He did not
wish the issue of the President's power to be considered as having
been decided sub silentio.
This decision, together with the one in Joint Anti-Fascist,
simply ignored the principle emphatically established by Andrew
Jackson that the President is master of his own official household.
Certainly if he is master of his subordinates it must be presumed
by the courts that he knows what they are doing and approves of
their long standing practices in respect to an issue of the importance
of the loyalty program. Moreover, these two cases also mark a
unique application of the doctrine that the courts will not intervene
in civil service removal cases except to insure compliance with ap-
plicable statutes. It seems evident that the majority in Peters lacked
a workable constitutional formula for curbing excesses of the se-
curity program so that they were reduced to expressing their dis-
approval by whipping a dead horse. 56
52 Cf. Kutcher v. Gray, 199 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
53 Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 354 (1955).
54 Id. at 352.
55 Ibid.
56 The provisions of the Eisenhower security order in effect at the time of
the decision explicitly recognized the existence of the practice and provided
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The net result of these decisions has been that all constitu-
tional attacks on the Truman loyalty order have been frustrated.
The upshot of Friedman was that courts could not interfere with
executive judgment of the fitness (loyalty) of a government em-
ployee. In Bailey, constitutional issues were canvassed with the
result that the Bill of Rights came off second best to the privilege
doctrine in support of a broad latitude of executive removal power.
The decision in Joint Anti-Fascist amounted to a light rap on the
Attorney General's knuckles but it gave employees no ground for
either challenging the black listing of organizations or proving the
innocence of their associations with proscribed groups. The ruling
in Peters was no more than a mild expression of judicial disapproval.
B. THE DOCTRINE OF SPECIFIC CHARGES
Since 1950, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
has decided three cases in which protective statutes have been in-
terpreted to afford the classified civil servant some protection in
security cases. Deak v. Pace57 raised the question whether the
Secretary of the Army had complied with a statutory requirement
that persons in the classified service removed on security grounds
should be "fully informed of the reasons...." 58 The charges against
the employees were that they had attended meetings open only to
members of the Comunist Party and of other organizations known
to be affiliated with that party. They were also charged with having
a sympathetic and active association with these organizations, but
they were not told of specific times or places at which they had
for its elimination by abolishing the various loyalty review boards and sub-
stituting therefore agency units for handling security cases. "Agency de-
terminations favorable to the officer or employee concerned pending before
the Loyalty Review Board on such date shall be acted upon by such Board,
and whenever the Board is not in agreement with such favorable determina-
tion the case shall be remanded to the department or agency concerned for
determination in accordance with the standards and procedures established
pursuant to this order." (Emphasis added) Executive Order 10450, §11,
3 C.F.R. (Supp. 1953).
57 185 F.2d 997 (D.C.Cir. 1950).
58 56 Stat. 1053 (1942), 8 U.S.C. 806(1952) (later repealed by 64 Stat. 477
(1950), 5 U.S.C. § 22-1 -22-3 (1952). This act, a modification of the Lloyd-
LaFollette Act, authorized the summary dismissal when "warranted by the
demands of national security" of any employee in the War or Navy Depart-
ments or the Coast Guard. Employees were given thirty days to make a
reply and to be "fully informed of the reasons for such removal."
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demonstrated this relationship. The court held that these employees
were entitled, under this statute, to demand more specific charges,
although the majority refused to lay down any rule of general
application, saying the circumstances of one case might be wholly
different from others. The court found the organizations were
openly known and sponsored so that national security could scarcely
be jeopardized if the Secretary were to make the charges specific.
More recently, however, this same court had occasion to say that
"Deak v. Pace expressly did not decide 'the course that should be
followed if security interests were thought to conflict with an
employee's right to precise information' . " 59
In the first of his two brushes with the loyalty-security sys-
tem, a legless veteran employed by the Veterans Administration,
James Kutcher, scored a victory of limited significance to most
employees. Once again a technicality momentarily saved an em-
ployee. Kutcher had been charged with membership in the Socialist
Workers Party, an organization on the Attorney General's list, and
was consequently removed because of doubt of his loyalty. Kutcher,
however, called his dismissal illegal because the Loyalty Review
Board had made mandatory under section 9A of the Hatch Act the
removal of employees who were members of organizations on the
Attorney General's list.60 Kutcher claimed, and the court agreed,
that the President's order 9835 required a personal finding by the
head of each agency before an employee could be dismissed. The
Loyalty Review Board was authorized only to make rules and reg-
ulations "not inconsistent with provisions of the Order and advise
departments and agencies on problems relating to employee loyalty
" . ,61 Agency decisions appealed to the Board were merely "for an
advisory recommendation." 62 Mere membership, then, in an or-
ganization on the Attorney General's list was not, by itself, evi-
59 Money v. Anderson, 208 F.2d 34, 38 n.11 (D.C.Cir. 1953) (There was
no discussion of constitutional issues in Deak v. Pace, 185 F.2d 997 (D.C.
Cir. 1950).)
6o Memorandum No. 32, Dec. 17, 1948, (later amended 5 C.F.R. p. 199,
App. A. (1949), revoked 18 Fed. Reg. 5099 (1953)).
01 Kutcher v. Gray, 199 F.2d 783,788 (D.C.Cir. 1952). Cf. Friedman v.
Schwellenbach, 159 F.2d 22 (D.C.Cir. 1946) cert. denied 330 U.S. 838 (1947),
where the court ignored the fact that the removal was not made by the
agency head.
32 Kutcher v. Gray, supra at 787. Certainly the doctrine seized upon in
Peters v. Hobby is evident here. This knife can cut both ways. In Jason v.
Summerfield, 214 F.2d 273, 279 (D.C.Cir. 1954) cert. denied 348 U.S. 840,
Judge Edgerton dissented on the grounds that the President's executive
order did not, by its own terms, direct the reopening of loyalty cases
under the new standard of Executive Order 10241.
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dence of disloyalty, 63 but the list might be used in loyalty proceed-
ings which the court termed administrative, and not of a nature
requiring the constitutional safeguards of a judicial trial. At the
same time the court held that membership in a proscribed organiza-
tion might justify an official doubt of an employee's loyalty. In con-
cuding that Kutcher had not enjoyed the procedural safeguards of
the President's order, the court also observed that procedures for
removing disloyal employees must, in the case of preference eligi-
bles,6 4 conform to the provisions of the Veterans' Preference Act.
Nevertheless, this act was construed to mean that loyalty removals
from individual positions were intended to promote efficiency of
the service in general.
Kutcher's more recent bout with the security system resulted
in a decision which may be highly important although its practical
effect is not yet entirely clear.65 At any rate, this decision extends
to some loyalty-security cases the doctrine of specific charges de-
veloped in such recent civil service cases as Money v. Anderson 66
and Mulligan v. Andrews. 67
Kutcher again faced the charge that there was official doubt
of his loyalty under Executive Orders 9835 and 10241. He was for-
mally charged with being an admitted member of the Socialist
Workers Party, of being employed by that party, of contributing
funds to its newspaper and with demonstrating "evidence of a
record of . . . association and activity with persons, associations,
movements and groups" on the Attorney General's list. After a
hearing and review of the record the Loyalty Review Board recom-
mended his dismissal. In support of its action the Loyalty Review
Board provided a summary statement of its conclusions, but when
Kutcher contested his removal in the district court the government
produced another sixteen-page document which was the Loyalty
Board's detailed record of its reasons for recommending Kutcher's
dismissal. This record revealed that the Board had reviewed reasons
why the Attorney General had listed the party and had also re-
63 See President Truman's statement of November 14, 1947, 5 C.F.R. § 200.1
(Supp. 1949) (revoked 18 Fed. Reg. 5699 (1953)), and Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 205-207 (1951), Mr. Justice
Reed dissenting.
64Veterans' Preference Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 387 as amended 5 U.S.C. §
851 (1952)
65 Kutcher v. Higley, 235 F.2d 505 (D.C.Cir. 1956).
66 208 F.2d 34 (D.C.Cir. 1953)
67211 F.2d 28 (D.C.Cir. 1954)
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viewed the record in Dunne v. United States. G8 According to this
hitherto secret record, the Board also accepted the decision in Dunne
that the party advocated the violent overthrow of the United
States government. The Board was of the opinion that Kutcher
could not be discharged solely because of his membership in the
party, but it asked whether "... one, who knowingly participates
actively in the furtherance of such an organization over a period
of years, stand (s) without reasonable doubt as to his loyalty...?" 69
The Board record also disclosed that according to its reports
Kutcher had once made a speech in support of the Communist Party
and had once stated he would not report a member of that party
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In reviewing Kutcher's case,
the Board considered itself on safe ground in following the doctrine
laid down by the Court of Appeals in the first Kutcher case:
membership in a proscribed organization is not of itself ground
for dismissal, but such an association may create a doubt of loyalty.
Since doubt of loyalty is a ground for official lack of confidence
in the employee (Bailey v. Richardson), dismissal is valid. Thus,
the essential factual situation in the second Kutcher case was not
different from the first.
The Court of Appeals, however, considered it unnecessary to
elaborate the point that the reasons for discharge formally given
to Kutcher in writing differed substantially from reasons revealed
in the lengthy report of the Loyalty Review Board-unknown to
Kutcher until they were introduced in trial court. Under the
Veterans' Preference Act this error was fatal to the government's
position. "Since only findings on the charges, specificially identi-
flied, can constitute reasons for removal, a reading of the charges
must demonstrate the reasons for dismissal, assuming all the charges
are sustained." '0 (emphasis added.) In comparing the formal
charges against Kutcher with the Board's secret record it was evi-
dent to the court that his employment by the party was not an im-
portant reason for his dismissal; membership in a proscribed or-
ganization could not of itself constitute a valid reason for removal
and no finding was made in respect to his financial support of the
party's newspaper. The fourth charge was, in the court's view, a
shotgun blast "wholly vague" and a mere summary of the pre-
ceeding three.
68 138 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied 320 U.S. 790.
69 Kutcher v. Higley, 235 F.2d 505, 508 (D.C.Cir. 1956).
To Id. at 509. Cf. Deviny v. Campbell, 194 F.2d 876 (D.C. Cir. 1952) Did the
court mean all charges, or a single charge sufficient in itself to warrant dis-
charge, must be sustained?
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There are numerous interesting facets to this decision. Most
important, the government must now face a preference eligible em-
ployee with specific and detailed charges which reveal the case
against him. Such a rule does not insure the demise of the face-
less informer, but it may be of great value to the accused employee
and his lawyer who are attempting to fight the shadows which
often obscure security cases. 71 Moreover, it may be of some sig-
nificance, or it may be a mere oversight, that the court did not
hedge its ruling with the usual exception that the reasons assigned
by the government for a security discharge must not reveal the
government's sources of information. In Deak v. Pace this same
court held that reasons for discharge were required by the ap-
plicable statute to be given employees, since none of the security
considerations said to be present in Bailey v. Richardson were pres-
ent. And, again, in Money v. Anderson this same court held that
specific charges must be presented since confidential informants
here did not require the anonymity necessary for national secur-
ity. 72 Certainly the court has not said to what extent the gov-
ernment must show its cards; and just as certainly the court has
not said that the hearing must be an adversary proceeding.
The court's use, and non-use, of precedents in this case is
intriguing. No mention is made of its decision five years earlier
in Bailey v. Richardson which gave unqualified support to the
loyalty purges. Mulligan v. Andrews, an "ordinary" civil service
case, is the majority's principal precedent, although the first
Kutcher case is also mentioned. It is true Miss Bailey was not
in the classified service and she had no veterans' preference
eligibility, but these facts only underscore the court's looseness
in undergirding the government's security system by dictum
in 1950. How much of the Bailey case would the court prefer to
forget? Since Kutcher came under the protection of the Veterans'
Preference Act, it is appropriate to question whether the court's
doctrine in this case applies also to the Lloyd-LaFollette Act. The
doctrine of specific charges has been applied in "ordinary" civil
service cases involving both acts recently and it is logical to
conclude that it will be applied to security cases falling under
the Lloyd-LaFollette Act in the future.
The practice of "guilt by association" seems to have been
71This advance may be of real value. See Elson, People, Government
and Security; An Analysis of Three Books and a Program, 51 Nw. U. L. Rev.
79, 83-92 (1956).
72 See note 28 supra.
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viewed in a new light in this case. The rule of the first Kutcher
case was a "this is the house that Jack built" verbalization. Mem-
bership in an organization on the Attorney General's list is not of
itself a reason for discharge, but such membership may create
official doubt of an employee's loyalty. Since official confidence
of superior in subordinate is the ultimate test of continued em-
ployment as regards security, doubt caused by membership is a
sufficient ground for dismissal! In the second Kutcher case,
however, the court reiterates the first premise of the syllogism
while omitting the remainder. Membership alone in listed or-
ganizations does not constitute a valid reason for discharge-and
the court is emphatic on this point. 73
73 In the light of old section 9A of the Hatch Act, 53 Stat. 1148 (1939),
5 U.S.C. §§ 118i-n (1952) (later amended by 69 Stat. 624, 5 U.S.C. §§ 118p-r
(Supp. 1956), as well as the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1955,
69 Stat. 6, 5 U.S.C. § 118j-1 (Supp. 1956), forbidding the employment of
persons who advocate, or are members of organizations which advocate, the
violent overthrow of the government of the United States, the court's
meaning on this point is not clear. In Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951), the Supreme Court took judicial notice of the Communist Party as
an organization advocating the violent overthrow of the government of
the United States. In Dunne v. United States, 138 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 790, rehearing denied, 320 U.S. 814, the conviction of
eighteen leaders of the Socialist Workers Party for violation of the Alien
Registration Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 671, 8 USC § 155 (1946) (later amended by
18 U.S.C. Hi 2385-87 (Supp. 1952)), was upheld. In the Dunne case,
however, the court carefully pointed out its belief that these leaders of the
party must have had knowledge of its unlawful aims. Section 9A of the
Hatch Act was sustained as constitutional in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee v. Clark, 177 F.2d 79, 84 (D.C.Cir. 1949), but this decision was
reversed without discussion of the validity of section 9A in Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). Section 9A
was not at issue in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947),
but the court used language broad enough to permit a reasonable inference
that the entire act was constitutional. Id. at 102-03. Assuming, then, the
validity of the present section, (69 Stat. 624, 5 U.S.C. §§ 118 p-r (Supp.
1956) ), as successors to section 9A, is admitted membership in the Socialist
Workers Party evidence of violation of a statute which not only forbids
continued employment of a person who advocates the violent overthrow
of the government of the United States, but also attaches punitive sanctions
to this felony? Should the answer be in the affirmative, it would appear
that Kutcher could not be continued in employment without violating the
statute. Yet the Loyalty Review Board apparently took the view that
membership in the Socialist Workers Party could not of itself be a sufficient
warrant for Kutcher's discharge, but could only be evidence of doubtful
loyalty. It is possible, of course, that the inarticulate assumption in the
opinion of the Court of Appeals is that scienter is necessary on the part of
the employee in view of the decisions in Gerende v. Board of Supervisors,
341 U.S. 56 (1951), Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951),
and Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). The statute does not appear
to say when the membership in any such organization must have been
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Lastly, it is obvious, despite the rule that the courts will not
consider civil service cases on their merits, that the Court of Appeals
did so in this case. It thoroughly reviewed the reasons why the
Loyalty Review Board recommended Kutcher's dismissal and found
them wanting when compared with official reasons actually given
to him as formal charges. It takes considerable judicial sleight of
hand to recast this action into a purely procedural question.
C. THE COLE CASE
On the final day of the 1955 term the Supreme Court announced
its decision in Cole v. Young.74 Initial public reaction appears to
have been that the Court has greatly limited the government's loy-
alty-security program for civilian employees. Those who favor such
a course have applauded the results.7 5 Careful analysis, however,
acquired so that some question of its efficacy might be raised. Does the law
apply to past membership, present membership, or both? Provision for
administrative removal of an employee member of such an organization
appears to be superfluous in the light of the fact that it is now a felony
for any such person to continue in the employment of the United States.
From the first Kutcher case it appears that the old Loyalty Review Board
considered membership in the Socialist Workers Party to be a violation of
section 9A. Since, in Kutcher v. Gray, 199 F.2d 783 (D.C.Cir. 1952), the
Court of Appeals invalidated Kutcher's removal on the ground that it was
the personal responsibility of the agency head to make the ultimate finding
respecting an employee's loyalty, its holding that mere membership in a
proscribed organization is not sufficient grounds for removal left the pre-
cise application of section 9A to loyalty removals clouded with doubt. The
court did not explicitly or implicitly say that membership in organizations
advocating violent overthrow is mandatory cause for removal, while mem-
bership in other organizations on the Attorney General's list is not. If the
old section 9A and the present statutes mean anything, it appears to be
that there is one ground for removal made mandatory by statute, unless
the executive order (Executive Order 9835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (1947) or Ex-
ecutive Order 10450, 3 C.F.R. (Supp. 1953)) is legally superior to the con-
flicting provisions of statute. Germane to the problem, but no answer to
the precise question, is the Supreme Court's observation that "[0] ne's asso-
ciates, past and present, as well as one's conduct, may properly be considered
in determining fitness and loyalty." (emphasis added) Adlier v. Board of
Education, 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952), and see Garner v. Board of Public
Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
74 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
75 See the editorial, N. Y. Times, June 13, 1956, p. 36, col. 1. News reports
indicated that initially, at least, the Department of Justice viewed the de-
cision as imposing no serious obstacle to the government's program. Later
however, Attorney General Brownell and Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission Phillip Young favored legislative modification of the statute
construed in this case. Their positions on this matter were not identical,
however, since Chairman Young apparently testified that the Court's de-
cision would cripple the government's program in some respects. N. Y.
Times, June 15, 1956, p. 14, col. 1 and July 7, 1956, p. 1, col. 8.
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suggests the utmost caution in concluding that the court has placed
any extensive barrier on executive authority to remove employees
on security grounds in either sensitive or non-sensitive positions.
Executive Order 10450 76 still stands as the basic instrument for
effectuating the federal civilian employee loyalty-security pro-
gram.
Cole, a veterans' preference eligible food inspector in the De-
partment of Health, Education and Welfare, was investigated under
the provisions of Executive Order 10450 and charged with close
association with Communists and with attending meetings of or-
ganizations on the Attorney General's list. Initially Cole refused
to explain the charges against him because he considered them to
be violations of his right of freedom of association. The Secretary
ordered his dismissal, but two weeks later Cole asked for a re-
opening of his case, stating that he would prove his associations
were innocent ones. The Secretary denied this request and a
second similar one. On appeal the Civil Service Commission held
his removal valid on the ground that section 14 of the Veterans'
Preference Act had been modified by Public Law 733. 77
Public Law 733 was enacted by Congress at the outset of the
Korean War with the apparent intent of making it easier for many
agencies of the executive branch to dismiss employees as "security
risks" instead of depending entirely on the provisions of Execu-
76 5 U.S.C. § 631 (Supp. 1955)
7764 Stat. 476 (1950), 5 U.S.C. § 22-1 - 22-3 (1952). The relevant pro-
visions are:
"That notwithstanding the provisions of section 6 of the Act of August 24,
1912 (37 Stat. 555), as amended (5 U.S.C. 652), or the provisions of any
other law, the Secretary of State; Secretary of Commerce; Attorney Gen-
eral; the Secretary of Defense . .. Army . . . Navy . .. Air Force ...
Treasury; Atomic Energy Commission; the Chairman, National Security
Resources Board; or the Director, National Advisory Committee for Aero-
nautics, may, in his absolute discretion and when deemed necessary in the
interest of national security, suspend, without pay, any civilian officer or
employee ... (of his agency or department): Provided, That to the extent
that such agency head determines that the interests of the national security
permit, the employee concerned shall be notified of the reasons for his
suspension and within thirty days after such notification any such person
shall have an opportunity to submit any statements or affidavits to the
official designated by the head of the agency concerned to show why he
should be reinstated or restored to duty. The agency head concerned may
... terminate the employment of such suspended civilian officer or em-
ployee whenever he shall determine such termination necessary or advisable
in the interest of the national security ... and such determination by the
agency head concerned shall be conclusive and final." Section 1 also pro-
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tive Order 9835. 78 Debate in the House revealed that Congress de-
sired to extend and make permanent the authority some agencies
had prior to 1950 to make summary security dismissals. 79 Under
Public Law 733 an agency head may, at his "absolute discretion,"
suspend and dismiss an employee in the interest of national secur-
ity. The reasons for such action may be given the employee "to
the extent that such agency head determines that the interests of
national security permit." The act specifies certain procedures for
an employee who has a "permanent or indefinite" appointment
and has completed his probationary period. He is authorized to have
the reasons for the charges (if security considerations permit),
an opportunity to reply within thirty days, a hearing at his own
request, a review of his case by the agency head or some person
designated by the head and a written statement of the decision
of the agency head. It is important to note that the written charges
"shall be stated as specifically as security considerations permit."
Thus the employee is authorized to know the case against him only
to the extent that his agency head believes security concerns allow.
Hearing and review in such cases are a matter of statutory right,
unlike the Lloyd-LaFollette and Veterans' Preference Acts.
The statute specifically names some eleven agencies author-
ized to employ the summary dismissal procedures. It also pro-
vides that the President may "from time to time" extend its pro-
visions to such other agencies as he may deem necessary in the
vided that such an employee shall have a written statement of the charges
within thirty days after suspension; a review by the agency head or some
agency designated by the agency head before an adverse decision shall be
final; and a "written statement of the decision of the agency head ....
This section also provides that "the termination of employment herein
provided shall not affect the right of such officer or employee to seek or
accept employment in other other department or agency of the Govern-
ment" after the prospective employing agency has consulted with the Civil
Service Commission. Section 3 provides that "this Act shall apply to such
other departments and agencies of the Government as the President may,
from time to time, deem necessary in the best interests of national security.
If any departments or agencies are included by the President, he shall so
report to the Committees on the Armed Services of the Congress." '
64 Stat. 476 (1950), 5 U.S.C. §§ 22-1-22-3 (1952). Section 14 of the Veter-
ans' Preference Act of 1944 provides for the removal of preference eligibles
only for causes that will promote the efficiency of the service and grants
among other procedural guarantees the right of appeal to the Civil Service
Commission whose decision is binding on the removing officer. 58 Stat. 390
(1944), as amended 5 U.S.C. § 865 (1952).
78 See debate in the House, 96 Cong. Rec. 10015-36 (1950).
79Authority existed under 56 Stat. 1053 (1942) and various riders to ap-
propriation bills such as 63 Stat. 456 (1950).
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interests of national security. A provision authorizes re-employment
of any person removed under the act's provisions, after "consulta-
tion" between the head of the agency proposing to re-employ the
individual and the Civil Service Commission. During House debate
this provision was included to satisfy members who favored giving
removed employees a right of final appeal to the Civil Service
Commission. It is expressly stipulated that this act modifies the
Lloyd-LaFollette Act and the provisions of "any other law." More-
over, determination by an agency head to remove an employee
"shall be conclusive and final."
In its opinion the Court limited itself to a narrow issue.
"The question for decision here is not whether an employee can
be dismissed on [loyalty and security] grounds but only the extent
to which the summary procedures authorized by the 1950 Act are
available in such a case." 1o
The Court noted that the government had established a
loyalty program during World War II and that Executive Order
9835 had been in effect for nearly three years before the passage of
Public Law 733. "Thus there was no want of substantive authority
to dismiss employees on loyalty grounds... " 81 If the limited effect
of the Court's decision is to be understood one should note the
repeated emphasis the opinion places on the issue. If Congress
had intended the summary procedures of this act to be employed
to insure the loyalty of all employees regardless of the relationship
of their positions to the national security, "rather than simply a
desirable personnel policy to be implemented under the normal
civil service procedures,' 2 (emphasis added) it would not have
limited the application of the statute to selected agencies. Else-
where the Court underscored the limitations of its decision by
saying that it might be difficult to justify ".. . summary suspensions
and unreviewable dismissals on loyalty grounds" for employees in
non-sensitive positions. "In the absence of an immediate threat of
harm to the 'national security,' the normal dismissal procedures
seem fully adequate and the justification for summary powers dis-
appears." s3 (emphasis added.) Presumably, "normal" dismissal
procedures are those authorized by the Lloyd-LaFollette and Veter-
ans' Preference Acts.
In holding that Cole's removal violated the Veterans' Preference
80 Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 544 (1956).
81 Ibid.
82 Id. at 545.
83 Id. at 546.
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Act the Court based its reasoning on the legislative history of the act
and the intent of Congress. In fact, it was very careful to avoid
the constitutional issue of Presidential versus Congressional power
to regulate employment of executive personnel. The majority said
the issue turns on the meaning of "national security" as used in
the act. Lacking legislative definition in express terms, the Court
construed the phrase to mean ". . . only those activities of the Gov-
ernment that are directly concerned with the protection of the Na-
tion from internal subversion or foreign aggression, and not those
which contribute to the strength of the Nation only through their
impact on the general welfare." s4 Thus, before using the summary
dismissal procedures authorized by this act, it is necessary to de-
termine that the employee occupies a position bearing a direct
relationship to the national security so interpreted. The Court
noted debates and reports of committees in both houses where it
found intent to limit removal procedures under this statute to
"sensitive" positions in the government. 85 The Court found further
warrant for its interpretation in authorization for the President
to extend the act to other agencies "from time to time". In view
of previous legislation which this act amended or replaced, the
Court thought it evident that Congress was concerned with only
"sensitive" agencies. Congress had merely enumerated some of
85 The statement of Rep. Edward H. Rees (R., Kan.) the ranking member
of the Committe on Post Office and Civil Service, is typical: "One of the
most important provisions of the legislation allows employees separated
as security risks from agencies covered by this bill to be employed in non-
sensitive Government agencies upon the approval of the Civil Service Com-
mission." 96 Cong. Rec. 9618 (1950). Similar statements were made by other
members of the House. Id. at 10020-24.
Cf. Hearings Before the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service of
the House on H.R. 7439, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., at 42-43, 60-61, 65, 67-74
(1950), where the assumption that the distinction between sensitive and
non-sensitive agencies would be maintained is manifest. There was no
debate to clarify the congressional intent in regard to the President's
authority to extend the act to all agencies. The Senate did not debate the
bill, although Sen. Saltonstall offered an extemporaneous explanation in
behalf of the Committee on the Armed Services which had heard the bill.
He said that it permitted summary dismissal on loyalty grounds with a right
of appeal to the Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission.
As Justice Clark pointed out in his dissent, however, some members of
Congress were aware that the language of the act could be interpreted to
extend the power of dismissal to every agency and position. Cole v. Young,
351 U.S. 536, 567 (1956).
84 Id. at 544.
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the agencies especially concerned with national security and had
given the President power to add other agencies when circumstances
dictated. Moreover, Congress would not, in the Court's view of
the legislative history, have authorized the re-employment of dis-
missed personnel, if it had intended to embrace all positions with
the act. Were the Court to accept the government's view of the
act, it said, Public Law 733 would have superceded other personnel
removal legislation in all but form.
In construing Executive Order 10450 the Court found the order
did not require the agency head to make any determination that
Cole's position was a sensitive one. The burden of proof must in
such a case fall on the government, not the employee. The Court
found that section 3 (b) of the order did distinguish between sensi-
tive and non-sensitive positions, but only for determining the na-
ture and scope of the investigation to be carried out in relation
to such positions. This section did not, however, limit use of the
summary removal procedures of Public Law 733 to sensitive posi-
tions. 116 It was the government's position that this statute author-
ized summary removals in security cases regardless of the nature
of the position. This contention the Court did not accept, but in-
80 Public Law 733 has not been applied so as to mean that every person
in every executive agency occupies a sensitive position; this determination
is for the discretion of the agency head. Mr. Philip Young was asked what
would happen under Executive Order 10450 to an employee who has worked
for an agency for a few years only to have his agency head notified that he
is a chronic drunk or a sex deviate.
"Mr. Young: Well, it would depend entirely on what position the man
holds.
Mr. Green: You mean that if he holds a sensitive position it would apply
and if he holds a non-sensitive position it would not apply.
Mr. Young: It depends upon the relationship of the position to the na-
tional security.
Mr. Green: In terms of whether it is sensitive or non-sensitive?
Mr. Young: You might have a position which would have a direct rela-
tion to the national security which would not be classed as sensitive.
Mr. Green: In other words, there are circumstances in which individuals
occupying a nonsensitive position, as that term is defined in the Executive
order, may be dismissed as security risks under Executive Order 10450
because they are chronic drunks or sex perverts or something of that kind?
Mr. Young: I certainly do not subscribe to your definition as to why he
was being fired. I was saying that it is certainly conceivable to me that you
can have a position which would fall for adjudication under Executive
Order 10450, section 8(a), which was classified by the head of the agency
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terpreted the act to authorize proceedings only in respect to sensi-
tive positions.
In a brief dissent Justice Clark, joined by Justices Reed and
Minton, opposed the majority because he thought the Court's opin-
ion "raises a serious question of presidential power under Article
II of the Constitution which it leaves entirely undecided." s Im-
plicitly, he thought, the majority raised a question as to the Presi-
dent's constitutional power to authorize dismissal of executive em-
ployees on security grounds. The majority, he said, excused its
avoidance of this issue on the ground that no contention had been
made that the Executive Order might be sustained under the Presi-
dent's constitutional executive powers. Justice Clark considered
it the business of the court to avoid constitutional questions when-
ever possible, but not to create them. He also thought the Court's
construction of the act, limiting its procedures to sensitive positions,
flew in the face of the express terms of the statute which provides
for the removal of "any civilian officer or employee," not any civil-
ian officer or employee in a sensitive position. He felt, moreover,
that Congress had discussed and approved the President's interpre-
as nonsensitive and yet which could have a direct relationship to the national
security.
Mr. Green: I see. Well, let us assume that an individual was dismissed
because he was drunk or a sex pervert, not under Executive Order 10450
but rather under the authority or ordinary civil-service laws and regula-
tions. Would this individual case turn up as a statistic in the Civil Service
Commission's tabulation of individuals dismissed under the security order?
... Mr. Young: I would go farther than that . . .As I testified before
Senator Johnston's committee last year, I said probably the bulk of such
terminations were made under civil-service regulations and procedures
rather than Executive order 10450 ... (f) or this period of May 27, 1953,
through last September, which is the most current figure I have unfortu-
nately at the moment, 28,153 Federal civilian employees were fired for
cause ... included ... are 3,002 persons who appear in the statistics ...
(under) standards set forth in section 8 (a) of Executive Order 10450. .. ."
According to the testimony of Philip Young in the period from May 27,
1953, to March 11, 1955, 54 cases were processed pursuant to section I of Pub-
lic Law 733. Of these cases 9 were resolved in favor of the employee and 29
against; 16 cases were closed without action and 11 were then pending.
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Reorganization of the Committee on
Government Operations of the Senate on S.J. Res. 21, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.,
530 (1955). For further illuminating testimony by Mr. Young, see his ex-
change with Sen. Humphrey, Id. at 537.
87 Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 565 (1956).
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tation of the act when he reported his actions to the houses as re-
quired by the terms of section 3 of Public Law 733. Is
Once again, as in Peters v. Hobby, the Court has rendered a de-
cision in a loyalty case giving government employees a victory that
is more apparent than real. The Court has only very gently applied
the brake to the loyalty-security program. It has said that there
is ample substantive authority for effecting the removal of em-
ployees from sensitive and non-sensitive positions on loyalty and
security grounds; Public Law 733 has in no way affected it. All
this legislation does, according to the Court, is provide the executive
with a procedure which may, at the discretion of an agency head,
effect dismissal from sensitive positions in a highly summary man-
ner. If the agency head decides national security requires it, he
may dismiss an employee without giving reasons and he may face
him with charges so vague as to reveal little of the government's
case against him. The nub of this matter is that Public Law 733
was concerned with procedures to be used to protect the national
security. Of course, it is important that the Court defined this
term to mean that this act applies only to sensitive positions-those
bearing a direct relation to the protection of this country from in-
ternal subversion and foreign aggression. The end result is that
loyalty and security dismissals made from non-sensitive positions
must be effected under the provisions of the Lloyd-LaFollette or
Veterans' Preference Acts, if an employee is in the classified service.
The Court certainly did not invalidate all of Executive Order 10450;
it is basic authority for determining that removal for many enum-
erated causes relating to "security" shall be carried out by executive
officers.
One wonders what inference can reasonably be drawn from
holding that Cole was denied some beneficial right when he was
erroneously removed under the provisions of Public Law 733 in-
stead of the Veterans' Preference Act. Of course, it is fairly obvious
that it is now necessary for executive agencies to designate sens-
itive positions explicitly in order to determine the applicable re-
moval statute. Since, in the Court's view, Cole had been denied the
protection of the Veterans' Preference Act, it is proper to ask what
this protection amounts to. Obviously, a preference eligible has a
statutory right to specific and detailed charges and final review of
his case by the Civil Service Commission, but this guarantee may be
a mere formalism if he is being removed under the provisions of sec-
tion 8 of Executive Order 10450 which lumps together willy-nilly,
88 See 99 Cong. Rec. 4511-43, 5818-5990 (1953).
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pinks, prostitutes, perverts and paranoids as security risks. It has
been the burden of this paper to demonstrate that unless the holding
in Kutcher v. Higley is construed much in favor of the employee,
civil servants in non-sensitive positions will be subjected to re-
moval procedures even more summary than the ones applied to
sensitive positions under Public Law 733. It begins to look as though
the Veterans' Preference Act, long the bete noire of most public per-
sonnel experts, affords the only hope of protection for employees
in non-sensitive positions.
In these circumstances the holding of Kutcher v. Higley stands
as most important in relation to loyalty-security dismissals from
non-sensitive positions. Should this decision weather any possible
future challenge it means that preference eligible employees will
at least be faced with specific and, apparently, detailed charges
before they are dismissed. One of the anomalies of existing per-
sonnel legislation, however, is that under Public Law 733 an ac-
cused employee in a sensitive position has a statutory right to the
ritual of a hearing and agency review of his case (regardless of
whether the government makes very specific or wholly vague
charges against him), while the employee in a non-sensitive position
has no statutory right to either of these procedural safeguards. Ob-
viously, an overhaul of the Lloyd-LaFollette and Veterans' Prefer-
ence Acts is due on this count. Moreover, with the extension of the
probationary period to three years before career or career-condi-
tional appointments, there appears to be little or no protection for
the beginning federal employee. 89
It is not amiss to note that the majority again glossed over the
constitutional issues. Aside from the fact that all the old matters of
due process were not even hinted at, the majority, like bloodhounds
without a sense of smell, ignored the separation of powers issue
implicitly involved. It is fairly obvious that this act has been con-
strued to limit the Executive's free choice of means in security re-
movals. The Court has demonstrated a preference for statute over
executive order. Surely such a choice raises the question whether
the President has an unfettered discretion in directing removal of
subordinates who seem clearly within the category of purely execu-
tive officers. It took no little judicial ledgerdemain for the Court
89 See Nadelhaft v. United States, 132 Ct.C1. 316, 131 F. Supp. 930 (1955).
The new system for career-conditional and career appointments is pro-
vided for in 69 Stat. 700 (1955), 5 U.S.C. § 631 (Supp. 1956), and Execu-
tive Order 10577, 5 U.S.C. § 631 note (Supp. 1956) Cf. 5 C.R.F. § 02.4 and
2.301 (Supp. 1954).
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to conclude that Executive Order 10450 was not intended to over-
ride the statute, but only to implement it. 90
Speculation about judicial behavior is commonly said to be
bootless, but one of the most intriguing aspects of this case is the
unanimity of the majority's six members. The constitutional ob-
jections repeatedly raised in the past, especially by Justices Black
and Douglas, evaporated in this case. Perhaps the majority feels
it has said the final, practicable word on the issue.
III. A CRITIQUE
As Justice Frankfurter has said, "It is a familiar experience in
the law that new situations do not fit neatly into legal conceptions
that arose under different circumstances to satisfy d iff e r e n t
needs." 91 Certainly the loyalty-security programs have created
new situations for which existing legal conceptions were not de-
signed. Administrative abuses have forced some modification of the
stiff principle that the courts cannot intervene in the executive man-
agement of personnel. The rule that public employment is not a
right but a privilege amendable at the will of the government still
01) See Cole v. Young, 351 U. S. 536, 557n.20 (1956). By way of contrast,
although not for clarity, it is well to note the Court of Appeals dismissed
the contention that the act required a distinction between sensitive and
non-sensitive positions. It called the provision allowing the President to
extend the act to all agencies entirely constitutional and refused to "ven-
ture into the intricacies of the executive-legislative relationship in respect
to executive employees.... The policies to be pursued in the matter by
Congress and the President are for them to determine, not for us." Cole v.
Young, 226 F.2d 337, 340 (1955). Elsewhere the Court of Appeals expressed
the view that the President's standard for retention (clearly consistent with
the national security), attacked in the lower court by Cole, was reasonable
under the statute "quite apart from the consideration that the President
may have such power . . . as a part of the direct constitutional grant of
'executive power.' There is a line somewhere beyond which Congress can-
not go in enacting prescriptions in respect to executive power over execu-
tive employees." Ibid. In dissenting, Judge Edgerton took the view that the
provision of Public Law 733 requiring the agency head to give a dismissed
employee a written decision of his determination required that the decision
state the reasons for the outcome. That is, he construed the term in the
generic sense in which it is usually employed in relation to court decisions;
a decision contains not only a statement of the judgment, but also the
reasons for reaching it. Id. at 343. Judge Edgerton also insisted that the
distinction between sensitive and non-sensitive positions was evident.
91 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 543 (1951).
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stands, although some of its vigor was sapped in the Wieman case."
Both of these doctrines were developed and applied at a time when
there was only a figurative handful of public employees and they
provided no more than an occasional outcry against the injustices
sometimes worked. But with the burgeoning bureaucracy of the
welfare state and two generations of total war there are too many
opportunities for injustice in the human relations of personnel man-
agement to leave every removal decision to the ultimate authority
of administrative omniscience. Then, too, as long as big bureaucracy
is a hated symbol of big government to the political right, the rage
for political purity will go on.
It is quite clear that from the Friedman case forward the ques-
tion as far as the federal courts are concerned has not been whether
a loyalty-security program is legal, but rather, whether any restric-
tions are necessary to curb administrative abuses in the interest of
justice. It is a striking coincidence that a similar attitude has re-
cently developed in respect to "ordinary" civil service removals,
although in dealing with both kinds of dismissals the courts have
moved cautiously. It has been necessary for them to break new
ground and stare decisis has not served them well. In fact only the
privilege doctrine and the rule of judicial non-intervention are
rooted in the soil of ancestral wisdom. In both the Peters and Cole
cases the court failed to cite a single precedent relevant to the basic
issues. Viewing the record of the last ten years it can be said that
the courts have not moved significantly away from the practice
of restricting judicial review of civil service removals to the inter-
pretation of applicable administrative regulations and statutes. Nor
have they yet adopted the view that administrative hearings granted
to accused employees must be adversary in nature.
As long as this country remains in a posture of armed alert,
anxiously guarding against the Communist world, the security virus
02 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). The court said that although
employees have no right to work for the state on their own terms such an
idea does not permit the "facile generalization that there is no constitu-
tionally protected right to public employment . . ." Id. at 191. Further:
"We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to public employ-
ment exists. It is sufficent to say that constitutional protection does extend
to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently
arbitrary or discriminatory." Id. at 192. The crack in the privilege doctrine
was further widened during the past term of the court in Slochower v.
Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956): "To state that a person
does not have a constitutional right to Government employment is only to
say that he must comply with reasonable, lawful and non-discriminatory
terms laid down by the proper authorities." Id. at 555.
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will produce endemic disease. Security regulations touching the
lives of not bnly government employees, but also millions of Ameri-
cans in private employment will be the order of the day. In such
circumstances Justice Douglas' remarks on the importance of pro-
cedural due process are highly pertinent. "It is procedure that spells
much of the difference between rule by law and rule by whim or
caprice." 13 The voice of Justice Brandeis from a generation ago
reminds us that in the "development of our liberty insistence on
procedural regularity has been a large factor." 94 We can no longer
afford the abusive luxury of mere ritualistic due process. The tale-
bearers need be brought into the open-at least those who are not
an integral part of the secret counterintelligence apparatus-before
any man is forced to wear the government's "badge of infamy."95
03Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 179
(1951).
94Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 477 (1921).
OZ5Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952). In the recent case of
Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955), the court held the govern-
ment's port security regulations a denial of due process because merchant
seamen were not confronted with the witnesses against them. The District
Court had merely directed the Coast Guard to confront suspected seamen
with charges sufficiently specific to permit their possible refutation without
revealing the government's sources of information. The Court of Appeals
said that the need for shielding the government's witnesses was more an
article of dogmatic faith than one of demonstrated truth. "Is this system
of secret informers, whisperers and tale-bearers of such vital importance
to the public welfare that it must be preserved at the cost of denying to
the citizen even a modicum of the protection traditionally associated with
due process?" Id. at 719. Significantly, according to a published news
report, the Department of Justice decided not to appeal. N.Y.Times, Mar. 26,
1956, p.1, col. 2. Of course, these merchant seamen were not government
employees, but they have no more constitutional right to employment than
the government worker.
For evidence that employers' "blacklists" have been used, at least against
scientists denied clearance, see the letter of M. Stanley Livingston, Chair-
man, Federation of American Scientists (not a proscribed organization!),
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Reorganization of the Committee on
Government Operations of the Senate on S.J.Res. 21, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.,
424 (1955), and his testimony. Id. at 414. Cf. Brown, Loyalty-Security
Measures and Employment Opportunities, 11 Bulletin of the Atomic Scien-
tists, 113 (1955), and Morgenthau, The Impact of the Loyalty-Security
Measures on the State Department, 11 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
134 (1955). See also Hattery, The Prestige of Federal Employment, 15 Pub-
lic Adm. Rev. 181, 182 (1955) on the adverse impact of loyalty-security
clearances on federal employment prestige. Cf. Chase, Security and Liberty,
55 (1955). See the testimony of M. Stanley Livingston, Hearings, Supra, 409:
Confrontation of witiiesses we think should be treated as a constitu-
tional right. Even if it is not, the arguments for denying it are not im-
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The consequences of being branded a security risk or disloyal
are as destructive as they are real. We must recognize that in our
complex industrial society a man must be able to seek employment,
usually at the hands of others. A social outcast can no longer stake
out a claim in the wilderness and survive by the toil of his muscles.
In such circumstances no man should be cast into darkness unless
those who sit in judgment have more than a mere doubt of his
worthiness. "It requires no argument to show that the right to work
for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the
very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was
the purpose of the (Fourteenth) Amendment to secure."' 0 At a
time when approximately one person out of every ten gainfully
pressive. In a very few cases these witnesses are paid informers or under
cover agents whose identity must be kept secret. Most witnesses (land-
ladies, et cetera) can be called without exposing essential secrets of the
investigation agency. Yet very few have been called in any cases heard
to date. This is the situation, despite President Eisenhower's direct
statement that the accused must have 'the right to meet your accuser
face to face.'
More recently the Special Committee on Communist Tactics, Strategy
and Objectives of the American Bar Association got at least one leg cau-
tiously over the fence with the following statement relative to the faceless
informer: "There has been a marked movement, (1) against the use of
such undisclosed information, and (2) compelling disclosure of source and
confrontation. It is the view of this committee that while the necessity for
such use of undisclosed information should be carefully guarded against
and avoided wherever possible, nevertheless, in the ultimate determination,
the national security must prevail.
The individual rights must be respected and preserved to the extent con-
sistent with national security. However, one who by his own conduct has
created a doubt as to his loyalty to this country should not expect the
Nation, or its responsible officials, to gamble national security on his
continued status or on a confidence in him which does not exist." (emphasis
added) 102 Cong. Rec. A2051 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1956).
For the case of Sidney Hatkin, see N.Y. Times, May 7, 1956, p. 15, cl. 1,
N.Y.Times, May 8, 1956, p.14, cl.4. Cf. Fund for the Republic, Case Studies
in Personnel Security (Yarmolinsky, ed. 1955); Blank, Security Risk, Look,
May 17, 1955, 25; Curtis, The Oppenheimer Case, (1955); Mason, Security
Through Freedom, (1955); O'Brian, National Security and Individual Free-
dom, (1955); Hollander, Crisis in the Civil Service, (1955); and Society for
Personnel Administration, The Federal Career Service 15 (Goode ed. 1954).
06 Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915). Although this doctrine was laid
down with respect to state power under the fourteenth amendment, the
Supreme Court has also said: "The Fifth Amendment . . . does not con-
tain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment which
applies only to the states. But the concepts of equal protection and due
process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not
mutually exclusive .... But, as this Court has recognized, discrimination
may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process." Boiling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
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employed works for government in the United States such employ-
ment must be considered one of the "common occupations of the
community." There is something stuffy about saying that govern-
ment employment is a privilege.
It is to be hoped that the vast resources of corporate scholarship
which have marked the recent report of the Bar Association of the
City of New York 97 will be heeded by the executive and legislative
branches of the government. The responsibility lies primarily with
them. But it does not serve our traditions of fair play well to have
the courts refuse to intervene in loyalty-security cases because the
separation of powers forbids judicial interference with executive
matters. The Bill of Rights is in the Constitution, too, and nowhere
does it distinguish government employees from other "persons."
There is, of course, a very great measure of wisdom in Justice
Frankfurter's plea for judicial restraint. "Full responsibility for
the choice cannot be given to the courts. Courts are not representa-
tive bodies. They are not designed to be a good reflex of a demo-
cratic society... History teaches that the independence of the judi-
ciary is jeopardized when courts become embroiled in the passions of
the day and assume primary responsibility in choosing between
competing political, economic and social pressures." 98 Neverthe-
less, ethical values bred into the bone and marrow of the Anglo-
Saxon tradition cannot be offered as timid sacrifices on the altar
of political expediency. In our democratic society the judiciary
has a noble calling which Justice Cardozo once stated with simple
beauty:
The great ideals of liberty and equality are preserved against
the assaults of opportunism, the expedience of the passing hour, the
erosion of small encroachments, the scorn and derision of those who
have no patience with general principles, by enshrining them in
constitutions, and consecrating to the task of their protection a
body of defenders.09
97 Report of Special Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, The Federal Loyalty-Security Program (1956). The recom-
mendations are summarized in N.Y. Times, July 9, 1956, p. 18, col. 2.
98 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951).
09 Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 92 (1921). To urge the
adoption of this point of view is not to say that it has always prevailed
with the Supreme Court, of course. See Sklar, The Fiction of the First
Freedom, 6 Western Pol. Q. 302 (1953); Prichett, Civil Liberties and the
Vinson Court, 239 (1954); Frank, Review and Basic Liberties, Supreme
Court and Supreme Law 109-36 (Cahn, ed. 1954). It should be said in de-
fense of the Supreme Court that its decision in United States v. Lovett, 328
U.S. 303 (1946) had the desireable effect of denying Congress entree into a
lush position by removing "subversive" executive employees through the
power of the purse.
